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Contracts. Summit Insurance Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523 (R.I.
2019). Insurance companies owe a fiduciary duty to their insured
to defend them against liability to third parties by “good faith and
fair dealings” with timely and fair settlement offers to the injured
within the policy limits.1 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has
declared that this fiduciary duty extends to an injured third party
when the insured has clearly assigned his or her rights to the third
party.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In April 2002, Eric Stricklett (Stricklett) operated a car which
struck and injured Scott Alves, an eleven-year-old boy, who had
jumped off his bike and ran into the road.3 Scott 4 underwent three
surgeries to repair his fractured tibia and fibula. 5 In December
2002, the Alves family (Alveses) submitted Scott’s medical records
to Summit Insurance Company (Summit); however, after
conducting an investigation, Summit determined Stricklett had no
fault for Scott’s injuries and informed the family that it would
“make no offers on this case.”6 Nearly eight years later, in April
2011, the Alveses hired a new attorney who reached out to Summit
informing them that the family would proceed with the lawsuit
against Stricklett.7 The Alveses’ attorney notified Summit by letter
that he disagreed with the finding that Stricklett had no fault in
the accident and asked Summit to provide information regarding

1. Summit Ins. Co. v. Stricklett, 199 A.3d 523, 528 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 529.
3. Id. at 524 n.6 (citing witness testimony).
4. Consistent with the Court’s opinion, Scott Alves will be referred to by
his first name. Additionally, Scott Alves, John Alves, and Cathy Alves will be
referred to collectively as the “Alveses.”
5. Summit, 199 A.3d at 524.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 524.
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the policy limits in Stricklett’s contract. 8 Summit requested the
Alveses call to discuss the claim; in response, the Alveses requested
a copy of the entire policy because they would “not be in a position
to discuss settlement . . . until [they had] seen the entire policy.”9
On May 9, 2011, the family provided Summit with Scott’s
medical records and bills, which included $59,792.66 in hospital
bills and $20,945 in orthopedic treatments, and indicated that they
were still waiting to receive a copy of the insurance policy. 10 Later,
the Alveses learned that “Summit could not locate a copy of the
insurance policy.” 11 Due to the unavailability of the policy, the
Alveses demanded a $300,000 settlement, stating that Summit was
liable for the policy limit of $25,000 and due to its failure to
previously offer its policy limits Summit would "undoubtedly be
held liable for all interest over and above the policy limit." 12
Further, the Alveses claimed that, “if Summit failed to settle and
the cases proceeded to trial, it would be ‘liable for all damages over
and above the policy limits in accordance with Asermely.’” 13
Summit responded by offering the Alveses the policy limit of
$25,000 which they rejected and subsequently filed suit against
Stricklett.14
Summit filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against
Stricklett and the Alveses, asking the court to declare that Summit
had “no duty to pay interest beyond its policy limits on any
judgment in connection with the underlying action” and that it had
“no duty to pay the Alves[es] anything beyond its policy limits on
any judgment in connection with the underlying action.” 15 The
Alveses counterclaimed for declaratory relief against Summit,
“alleging that Summit was liable for ‘pre-judgment interest accrued
upon all damages’ from Scott’s injuries and ‘for all damages over
and above any provable policy limit.’” 16 Both parties filed cross8. Id. at 524–25.
9. Id. at 525 (alteration in original).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.; Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999).
14. Summit, 199 A.3d at 525.
15. Id. (alteration in original).
16. Id. Stricklett only indirectly participated in the succeeding litigation.
Id.
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motions for summary judgment, which were denied because the
hearing justice determined that “there were genuine issues of
material fact concerning what had transpired between the parties
in 2003, following the Alveses' claim.” 17 Meanwhile, the Alveses
submitted a motion for the declaratory-judgment action to be given
priority over the tort suit, and the Superior Court granted that
motion. 18
One year later, the trial justice issued judgment in favor of
Summit. 19 In his decision, the trial justice interpreted Summit’s
insurance policy and concluded that the policy’s interest provision
“did not require that Summit pay interest in excess of the policy
limit and that this contract provision did not violate Rhode Island
law.” 20 The trial justice then examined the rejected settlement
offer statute 21 and determined that “the statute did not apply in his
case because the Alveses had never made an offer to Summit at or
around the policy limits.” 22 Finally, the trial justice concluded that
Summit owed no duty to the Alveses because they “were neither
Summit’s insureds nor assignees of the rights of Summit’s
insureds.” 23 Although the trial justice noted that an insurer only
owes its insured a duty, on March 13, 2017, he entered a final
decision with a contradictory ruling, which stated that “Summit
does owe a duty to the Alves[es] to act in a reasonable manner and
in good faith in settling the claim,” but found that Summit had
fulfilled this duty and hence was “not required to pay all

17. Id.
18. Id. at 525–26.
19. Id. at 526.
20. Id. at 526–27.
21. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.2 provides that when a plaintiff makes a
written offer to the defendant’s insurer in an amount equal to or less than the
coverage limits and the defendant’s insurer rejects the offer, the defendant’s
insurer shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment entered by the court,
even if the payment of the judgment and interest totals a sum in excess of the
policy coverage. Id. at 527 n.12.
22. Id. at 527. The trial judge declined to rule on the applicability of the
prejudgment interest statute because he believe it would be premature to
decide this issue. Id.
23. Id.
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prejudgment interest that has accrued on the action.” 24 On March
17, 2017, the Alveses filed a timely appeal.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) “review[s] a
declaratory decree of the Superior Court with an eye to whether the
court abused its discretion, misinterpreted the applicable law,
overlooked material facts, or otherwise exceeded its authority.” 26
“However, questions of law are reviewed de novo.” 27
On appeal, “the Alveses aver[ed] that the duty of an insurer to
affirmatively settle an insurance claim on behalf of its insured . . .
applies with equal force to third-party claimants in the form of a
duty of good faith and fair dealings.” 28 Further, the Alveses
asserted that Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent “instruct[s]
that a duty of good faith and fair dealing runs from the insurer to
the third-party claimant regardless of whether there has been an
assignment of the insured's rights.” 29 However, the Court noted
that it “has never recognized such a duty and has never held that
an insurer has extracontractual liability to a third-party claimant
in addition to a contractual, fiduciary duty to its insured for failing
to settle a claim in a timely manner where § 27-7-2.2 was not
applicable.”30 Due to the lower court’s contradictory holding and
the Alveses misconceptions of the precedent, the Court found it
necessary to clarify its past decisions.31
The Court began its discussion of “relevant opinions” with
Asermely; a case where an arbitrator awarded a settlement offer
within the policy limits to the third-party claimant, which the
insurer denied. Following the trial, the verdict returned was an
24. Id. (quoting trial judgment) (alteration in original).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 528 (quoting State ex rel. Kilmartin v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187
A.3d 1090, 1098 (R.I. 2018)).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (citing Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999);
DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585 (R.I. 2011); Skaling v. Aetna Ins.
Co., 742 A.2d 282 (R.I. 1999) (Skaling I); and Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799
A.2d 997 (R.I. 2002) (Skaling II)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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amount well above the policy limit, which the insurer refused to pay
in full. 32 After receiving assignment of the insured’s claims against
the insurer, Asermely filed suit against the insurer for disregarding
its duty to the insured in bad faith.33 The Superior Court ruled in
favor of the insurer, and on appeal, the Court reversed.34 The Court
held that an insurance company has “a fiduciary obligation to act
in the best interests of its insured in order to protect the insured
from excess liability”;35 therefore, if a plaintiff makes a reasonable
settlement offer within the policy limits which is denied by the
insurer, then the insurer is liable for any verdict over the policy
limit. 36 Additionally, the fiduciary duty extends not only to the
insured, but also to “a party to whom the insureds have assigned
their rights.” 37
The Court then discussed its decisions in Skaling I and Skaling
II which “involved a first-party claim brought by an insured directly
against its insurer for the refusal to pay underinsured motorist
(UIM) benefits pursuant to the insurance contract involved in those
cases.” 38 In Skaling I, the Court “held that [the insurer] was liable
for all prejudgment interest pursuant to § 9-21-10, because [the
insurer] had breached its duty to the plaintiff-insured ‘by refusing
to cover the damages within the contractual limits.’” 39 Following
the Court's decision, the insurer “moved for summary judgment in
the Superior Court on an outstanding claim alleging insurer bad
faith, arguing ‘that [the plaintiff's] claim against the underinsured
tortfeasor was a fairly debatable claim, thereby relieving [the
insurer] of any liability for insurer bad faith.’” 40 The hearing justice
granted the insurer’s motion and the plaintiff once again filed an
appeal with the Supreme Court. 41 The Court vacated the decision
below and explained “that the duty of good faith and fair dealing
includes an affirmative duty to engage in timely and meaningful
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 529.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 530.
39. Id. at 529 (quoting Skaling I, 742 A.2d 282, 292 (R.I. 1999)).
40. Id. at 530 (quoting Skaling II, 799 A.2d 997, 1001 (R.I. 2002)).
41. Id.
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settlement negotiations and to make and consider offers of
settlement consistent with an insurer’s fiduciary duty to protect its
insured from excess liability.” 42 Unlike Asermely, Skaling II
reiterated that the insurer has an obligation to act in the best
interests of its insured with no mention or extension to a third party
claimant. 43
Finally, the Court discussed DeMarco, where the Court
considered “whether the Asermely rule should be expanded to
situations with multiple-third party claimants.” 44 The Court
explained that the insurer’s duty to relieve the insured of as much
liability as possible must be dealt with in “good faith and fair
dealing” when multiple claimants exist and that “an assignee can
bring a claim against an insurer, even after the insured has been
absolved through an execution of release.” 45 Ultimately, the Court
held that the Asermely rule is applicable in the multiple-claimant
context.46
Here, the Court found that Asermely did not apply to the
Alveses’ case because they never presented an offer within the
policy limits to Summit, which is the only time that an insurer must
seriously consider a settlement offer. 47 The Alveses claimed that
they could file suit against Summit under Asermely, which allowed
a third party assignee of the insured’s rights to sue for operating in
bad faith during settlement negotiations. 48 However, the Court
found two reasons why the Alveses’ claim failed: no offer was made
within the policy limits and no assignment of the insured’s rights
was given to the Alveses. 49 Unlike Asermely, where the settlement
offer was within the policy limits, the Alveses only settlement offer
was made eight years after the accident for $300,000, which was six
times the policy limit; therefore, the Alveses never made a
reasonable settlement offer to be seriously considered by Summit. 50
42.
43.
44.
2011)).
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (quoting Skalling II, 799 A.2d at 1005-06).
Id.
Id. (quoting DeMarco v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 A.3d 585, 605 (R.I.
Id. at 530–31.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525, 532.
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Additionally, the Alveses argued Summit owed them a duty
based on specific language from DeMarco, which states that
although Skaling II involved a first-party claimant and Asermely a
third-party claimant, both cases implicated similar policy
concerns. 51 However, the full context of the sentence further
indicates that the insurer is obligated to put forth efforts to reduce
the burden on the insured. Thus, although the precedent cases may
change in context from third-party claims to first-party claims, it
remains constant that the insurance company’s duty for “good faith
and fair dealing” in the underlying settlement discussions is to the
insured, or under Asermely, to a third party claimant to whom the
insureds have assigned their rights. 52 Accordingly, the Court found
Summit owed no duty to the Alveses and determined that the trial
justice’s conclusion that Summit owed a duty and fulfilled this duty
by acting reasonably and in good faith was incorrect. 53
COMMENTARY
The Court, in deciding Summit never had a duty to exercise
“good faith and fair dealing” with the Alveses during settlement
proceedings, distinguished the facts in the instant case from those
in Asermely, the controlling law, and Skaling I, Skaling II, and
DeMarco, the clarifying cases. 54 The Court decided that these
distinctions and clarifications were necessary to prevent a floodgate
of litigation brought by third-parties against insurers. 55 To allow a
third party to bring a breach of duty claim against an insurer
absent an assignment would expand an insurance company’s
potential liability and establish a new judicially-created cause of
action. 56 Courts generally wish to avoid the creation of judiciallycreated causes of action because it is the state legislature’s job to
make the law. 57
Here, the statute at issue is Rhode Island General Laws section
27-7-2.2, which states “in any civil action in which the defendant is
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 532.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528, 533.
Id. at 533.
McCullough v. State, 490 A.2d 967, 969 (R.I. 1985).
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covered by liability insurance and in which the plaintiff makes a
written offer to the defendant’s insurer to settle . . . and the offer is
rejected by the defendant’s insurer, then the defendant’s insurer
shall be liable for all interest due on the judgment.” 58 In section
27-7-2.2, the legislature makes many references to the “defendant”
and the “defendant’s insurer” thus demonstrating its intent that
the duty owed by the insurance company is to the company’s
insured. Therefore, in Asermely, the Court had the authority under
the statute to extend the cause of action to a third party who was
assigned the rights of the insured because the defendant-insured’s
rights against the insurance company were transferred to a third
party.59
It was proper for the Court to deny the Alveses’ claim that they
could sue Summit under Asermely. Given that the purpose of the
statute is to allow suit against an insurance company based on the
insured’s rights, the Court could not judicially create a cause of
action allowing a third party to sue an insurance company for
breach of duty when no legal duty is owed to that party, as this
would directly contravene legislative intent. 60
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an insurer owes no
duty to a third party claimant and further clarified that Asermely
only allows a third party claimant to sue an insurer on grounds of
a duty of good faith and fair dealing if there has been an assignment
of the insured’s rights and a reasonable settlement offer within the
policy limits was rejected by the insurer.
Amanda LaRocca

58.
59.
60.

27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.2 (emphasis added).
Summit, 199 A.3d at 529.
Id. at 533.

